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EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OTHER CRIMES:
ADMISSIBILITY IN MINNESOTA
There are two ways of stating the rule concerning evidence of
defendant's commission of other crimes.- The most frequent way of
stating it is that it excludes any evidence which shows the defendant
to be guilty of other crimes unless it is pertinent to the proof of
defendant's commission of the crime charged.2 The "unless" por-
tion of this rule is usually stated in the form of exceptions.: Stated
another way, the rule will admit evidence of other crimes if it is
relevant-unless its relevance is to show only a general disposition
of the accused to commit the crime in question.4 Professor Stone
has contended that the admission theory was the original rule, and
the exclusion theory developed through misapplication of the
former.5 Under either statement the result is to exclude such evi-
dence if it has probative value only to show a disposition of the
defendant to commit the crime charged. Under either, it is the
doing of the act that is important. Conviction is not necessary before
the evidence can be admitted,7 but mere arrest8 or punishment 9
cannot be shown.
The correlative problem of the defendant wishing to present
evidence of crimes by third persons also presents itself in some
of these cases. WThere such evidence has materiality in absolving
the defendant from guilt, he should be allowed to present it."'
1. This Note concerns evidence of other crimes of the defendant as sub-
stantive evidence only. It does not cover the subject of impeachment of wit-
nesses other than the defendant, which was covered in Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev.
724, 735-738 (1952), nor does it cover the subject of character evidence.
2. See 2 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence § 623 et seq. (2d ed. 1926).
3. Ibid.
4. See Stone, The Ride of Exclusion of Similar Fact Ezidence: America,
51 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 993 (1938) ; 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 511, 514 (1940).
5. Stone, supra note 4, at 993-1000.
6. See St. Paul v. Greene, 56 N. W. 2d 423, 426 (Minn. 1952). But cf.
note 56 infra and text thereto.
7. See State v. Anderson, 155 Mim. 132, 192 N. W. 934 (1923) (evi-
dence of a crime of which defendant had been acquitted held admissible). The
problem of self-incrimination would appear to be the only other problem con-
nected with presenting evidence of a mere commission, not a conviction, of a
crime, and that problem could only appear in cases in which the prosecution
seeks to elicit the evidence through cross-examination of the defendant.
8. Cf. State v. Bryant, 97 Minn. 8, 9, 105 N. W. 974 (1905) ; State v.
Renswick, 85 Minn. 19, 22, 88 N. W. 22, 23 (1901) ; see 3 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence § 1421 (11th ed. 1935).
9. Cf. Harding v. Great N. Ry., 77 Minn. 417, 420, 80 N. W. 358, 359
(1899) (by implication).
10. The most common situation is in carnal knowledge cases. The rule
is clear that ordinarily the defendant cannot show acts of the prosecutrix
with other men as it has no bearing on the defendant's guilt of the crime
charged. State v. Kraus, 175 Minn. 174, 220 N. W. 547 (1928) ; State v.
McPadden, 150 Minn. 62, 184 N. W. 568 (1921). However, where the prose-
cution has alleged or attempted to prove that the prosecutrLx has become preg-
NOTES
REASONS FOR THE RULE
Various reasons have been advanced in support of the rule re-
stricting admission of evidence of other crimes. Of these, the
danger of prejudice to the defendant is the most substantial,"1 for
there is merit to the contention that the complexities of human
nature render inconclusive an assumption of guilt of the act
presently charged because of other commissions of the same or
similar acts.12 Other reasons are the failure to inform the defendant
that he must be prepared to meet extraneous charges,1 3 the danger
that the jury may convict now because the defendant has escaped
punishment in the past,14 and that the admission of such evidence
unduly consumes trial time.'5 Lastly, it is felt that since ours is
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of justice, the
prosecution must prove the defendant guilty of the specific crime
charged by evidence relevant to the issues rather than by going into
his past conduct.'6
THE EXCLUSION THEORY IN PRACTICE
The M1linnesota court purports to follow the exclusion theory of
the rule.1 7 Under it, evidence is admissible if it comes under one
of the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility. It is not
enough to show that evidence tends to establish a certain exception
to the exclusion rule. That exception must also constitute a material
portion of the crime.'3 Since production of the evidence is justified
by necessity, if other evidence has substantially established this
nant or contracted venereal disease as a result of defendant's act, the evidence
is admissible to show the falsity of such a claim. See State v. Elijah, 206 Minn.
619, 621, 289 N. W. 575, 577 (1940) ; State v. Kraus, supra at 179-180, 220,
N. W. at 549. In forgery cases the defendant is allowed to introduce evidence
of commission of forgeries similar to the one with which he is charged to
negative an inference of his own guilt. State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 39
N. W. 2d 887 (1949). Where the defendant seeks to introduce evidence of
criminal acts of the decedent to show his quarrelsome nature, and thus aid
defendant in establishing his plea of self-defense, it must be shown that the
defendant knew of this characteristic for the evidence to be admissible. State v.
Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 431, 98 N. W. 334, 339 (1904).
11. See State v. Eames, 163 Minn. 249, 203 N. W. 769 (1925).
12. See Wigmore, Evidence § 192 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Cf. State v. Haney, 219 Minn. 518, 520, 18 N. W. 2d 315, 316 (1945);
see 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 344 (lth ed. 1935).
14. See State v. Doty, 167 Minn. 164, 166, 208 N. W. 760, 761 (1926).
15. Cf. State v. Haney, 219 Minn. 518, 520, 18 N. W. 2d 315, 316 (1945).
16. See People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 292-293, 61 N. E. 286,
294 (1901). This case is perhaps the most famous, or infamous, of all cases
concerning evidence of other crimes. Evidence concerning another poisoning
by the defendant similar to the one charged was held to be inadmissible.
17. See St. Paul v. Greene, 56 N. W. 2d 423 (Minn. 1952).
18. See 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence 485 (lth ed. 1935).
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element, the proof of other crimes is inadmissible.' 9 Of course,
where the crime shown is actually part of the same transaction as the
crime charged, resort to an exception to bring the evidence in is
unnecessary for no showing of other crimes is involved.20 Con-
versely, when the prosecutor is permitted to present some evidence
to show defendant guilty of other crimes under the promise of
showing it to be under one of the exceptions and then fails to show
the crime, it is reversible error not to strike such evidence with
proper instructions.
2 1
An early case2 2 cast doubt on the admissibility of subsequent
acts. Later cases, however, admitted subsequent acts to show scheme
or plan23 and opportunity and inclination.2 4 In several cases sub-
sequent acts were held admissible, but no reason for their admission
was given.2 5 The major requirement is that such acts must not be
too remote, 26 and they must, of course, satisfy the other require-
ments for admissibility of other crimes generally.27 Some other
jurisdictions have held inadmissible subsequent acts offered to
show knowledge.28 Whether Minnesota would reach the same re-
sult is questionable.2 9 However, the fact that an act is subsequent
may in itself render it incapable of showing the element for which
it is presented. In such cases the act would be inadmissible purely
because it would be irrelevant-not inadmissible per se because
subsequent.
19. An example is that other crimes are inadmissible to show intent
where the criminal intent is presumed from the act itself. People v. Lons-
dale, 122 Mich. 388, S1 N. W. 277 (1899) ; see Anderson v. United States,
18 F. 2d 404, 405 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Wharton, op. cit. supra at 522-523.
20. State v. Pugliese, 149 Minn. 126, 182 N. W. 958 (1921) ; State v.
Mueller, 38 Minn. 497, 38 N. W. 691 (1888) (alternative holding).
21. State v. Johnson, 173 Minn. 543, 217 N. W. 683 (1928) (by impli-
cation) ; see State v. Gulbrandsen, 57 N. W. 2d 419, 423-424 (Minn. 1953).
22. State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 30, 138 N. W. 937, 938 (1912).
23. State v. Oelschlegel, 173 Minn. 598, 218 N. W. 117 (1928).
24. State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915).
25. State v. McPadden, 150 Minn. 62, 184 N. W. 568 (1921) ; State
v. Rutledge, 142 Minn. 117, 171 N. W. 275 (1919).
26. See id. at 119, 171 N. W. at 276; State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187,
189, 150 N. W. 793, 794 (1915).
27. See Witters v. United States, 106 F. 2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
State v. Roby, supra note 26; 25 Va. L. Rev. 234 (1938).
28. Witters v. United States, supra note 27; Dampier v. State, 191
Ind. 334, 132 N. E. 590 (1921); see People v. Baskin, 254 Ill. 509, 513, 98
N. E. 957, 959 (1912). The reasoning of these cases is that while the knowl-
edge indicated by a prior act is presumed to continue to the act charged.
knowledge found in a subsequent act cannot be imputed retroactively.
29. See State v. Jansen, 207 Minn. 250, 255, 290 N. W. 557, 560 (1940)
"While one isolated act in investigating and reporting on a claim might be
explained upon the ground that it was innocently committed through mistake
or otherwise, other similar acts with respect to the same claim . . . have
a reasonable and natural tendency to show that the specific act was knowingly
committed with unlawful intent. . . . It makes no difference whether the
acts came before or after the offense charged."
[Vol. 37: 608
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The exceptions most often relied on to admit evidence are those
which establish capacity to do the act, scheme or plan, knowledge
or belief, intent, motive, and identity.3" Under this rule, however,
the evidence has also been admitted to show malice, 31 to complete the
res gestae, -3 2 to rebut inference of mistake,33 to show readiness or
unwillingness to commit the crimes charged, 34 to characterize the
specific act charged, 3 and even to show an inclination of the de-
fendant to commit the particular act charged.36
Consideration should be given to some of the problems of inter-
pretation and application of the various exceptions arising under
the exclusion theory. At the outset one is faced with the difficulty
of categorizing cases in terms of the various exceptions which have
been offered to rationalize admissibility in spite of the fact that no
reference is made to such a category in the opinions themselves.
Numerous cases have held evidence of other crimes admissible to
establish the defendant's possession of the gun involved in the crime
charged, 37 or to show defendant's possession of liquor in prosecu-
tions for illegal sales.3 8 Decisions such as these conform to the
traditional function of the capacity exception.39
On the other hand, the Minnesota court has expressly justified
its decision by reference to the capacity exception when the facts
30. State v. Gifis, 195 Minn. 276, 262 N. W. 637 (1935) (knowledge);
State v. Voss, 192 Minn. 127, 255 N. W. 843 (1934) (intent); State v.
Nichols, 179 Minn. 301, 229 N. W. 99 (1930) (capacity) ; State v. Lindstrom,
180 Minn. 435, 231 N. W. 12 (1930) (motive); State v. Thornton, 174 Minn.
323, 219 N. W. 176 (1928) (intent) ; State v. Oelschlegel, 173 Minn. 598,
218 N. W. 117 (1928) (scheme or plan); State v. Hacker, 153 Minn. 538,
191 N. W. 37 (1922) (scheme or plan); State v. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 9
N. W. 698 (1881) (motive); see State v. Luckin, 129 Minn. 402 152 N. W.
698 (1915) (identity) ; 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 217 (3d ed. 19405.
31. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 245 (11th ed. 1935).
32. Underhill, Criminal Evidence 193 (3d ed. 1923); 1 Wharton, Crim-
inal Evidence § 347 (lth ed. 1935); Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 779, 785-786
(1950).
33. See State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 455, 231 N. W. 225, 227 (1930);
see Underhill, Criminal Evidence 194 (3d ed. 1923); 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence 490 (1lth ed. 1935).
34. State v. Doty, 167 Minn. 164, 208 N. W. 760 (1926).
35. State v. Priebe, 221 Minn. 318, 22 N. W. 2d 1 (1946) ; see State
v. Voss, 192 Minn. 127, 129, 255 N. W. 843, 844 (1934).
36. See, e.g., State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915) ; State
v. Hartung, 141 Minn. 207, 169 N. W. 712 (1918) ; State v. Schueller, 120
Minn. 26, 13S N. W. 937 (1912) ; see State v. Whipple, 143 Minn. 403, 407,
173 N. W. 801, 802 (1919).
37. See, e.g., State v. Hankins, 193 Minn. 375, 258 N. W. 578 (1935)
State v. Nichols, 179 Minn. 301, 229 N. W. 99 (1930) ; State v. McClendon,
172 Minn. 106, 214 N. W. 782 (1927) ; State v. Barrett, 40 Minn. 65, 41 N. W.
459 (1889).
38. See, e.g., State v. Upson, 162 Minn. 9, 201 N. W. 913 (1925) ; State
v. Van Vleet, 139 Minn. 144, 165 N. W. 962 (1918).
39. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 88 (3d ed. 1940).
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do not warrant its application. In State v. Priebe,40 the court ad-
mitted evidence of shoplifting at other stores shortly before de-
fendant's arrest for shoplifting, reasoning that the evidence was
properly admitted to show defendant's capacity or skill to do the
act charged, or because it "[c]haracterized her possession of the
goods found in her possession.141 If other shoplifting shows capacity
to shoplift, it would appear to follow that other robberies or
murders or perjury would be perfectly relevant evidence to show
capacity in a prosecution for such a crime. By such an application
the rule could be completely circumvented. The decision can be
explained, however, by an application of the scheme or plan ex-
ception. The logical consistency of the decision is saved by a last-
minute reference to this exception.
42
The exception to show scheme or plan has been the most often
used exception in Minnesota and has been used to admit evidence
in prosecution for a great number of different crimes.4 3 This excep-
tion proceeds upon an assumption that the showing of a series
of closely-related crimes raises a probability that the defendant
committed the one in the series for which he is under prosecu-
tion.4 4 Therefore, the acts offered to show the scheme cannot be
anonymous-their connection with the defendant is a necessary
foundation for the admissibility of the evidence.45 In prosecutions
for arson, the court has admitted the evidence to show what in effect
is a method of operation,4 reasoning that the similarity between the
crime shown to have been committed by the defendant and the
one in issue tends to corroborate the proof of the crime charged.
While these cases are not inconsistent with the basic rationale
of the scheme or plan exception, the court has not always kept
that rationale in mind. In a prosecution for robbery where the only
issue presented was whether the defendant conspired to commit
the crime in question, prior crimes by the alleged co-conspirator
were admitted to show the conspiracy although no connection be-
40. 221 Minn. 318,22 N. W. 2d 1 (1946).
41. Id. at 322,22 N. W. 2d at 3.
42. Ibid.
43. See, e.g., State v. Yurkiewicz, 212 Minn. 208, 3 N. W. 2d 775
(1942) (swindling) ; State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. W. 225 (1930)
(bribery) ; State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 192 N. W. 737 (1923) (illegal
sale of liquor) ; State v. Hacker, 153 Minn. 538, 191 N. W. 37 (1922) (lar-
ceny) ; State v. Whipple, 143 Minn. 403, 173 N. W. 801 (1919) (illegal
sale of narcotics).
44. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 304 (3d ed. 1940).
45. See State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 207-208, 240 N. W. 456,
459 (1932); State v. Friedman, 146 Minn. 373, 378, 178 N. W. 895, 897
(1920).
46. See State v. Golden, 173 Minn. 420, 217 N. W. 489 (1928) ; State
v. Ettenberg, 145 Minn. 39, 176 N. W. 171 (1920).
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tween the defendant and the prior crimes was shown.47 Similarly,
in a prosecution for car theft a prior car theft was shown although
the defendant had been tried and acquitted of that crime.48 Another
robbery case admitted evidence of similar robberies in the vicinity
although there was apparently no attempt to connect the defendant
with those prior crimes.40 Anonymous crimes can have no relevance
in deciding whether the defendant committed the crime with which
he is charged. Their admission under the guise of the scheme or
plan rule can serve no useful purpose and cannot fail to make
more difficult the jury's job of basing its decision on relevant
evidence.
The distinction between showing knowledge and showing in-
tent is a difficult one. While the abstract distinction is easy to
state,;" in most cases a showing that the defendant had knowledge
of the wrongfulness of his act in turn goes to show that he had the
necessary criminal intent, and evidence showing that the defendant
intended a criminal act often shows he had knowledge of its wrong-
fulness. The Minnesota court has indicated difficulty in distinguish-
ing between these two exceptions in several cases,51 stating that
evidence was admissible either to show knowledge or intent. Where
the question has been whether or not the defendant committed
the act by mistake, such as where he has made incorrect entries
in records, evidence admitted under another apparent exception, i.e.,
to rebut the inference of such a mistake, also shows guilty knowl-
edge and intent. At times, when faced with such a situation, the
court has admitted the evidence on the basis of all three exceptions.
5 2
The term "res gestae" has been much criticized as being a catch-
all, imprecise term. 3 While the mere fact that another crime was
committed during a period of time known as the "res gestae" has
little to do with the relevance of that crime in showing anything
material to the proof of the crime charged, the motivation for this
exception is legitimate. It seeks to prevent the exclusion of evidence
which shows an independent crime in cases where that crime and the
one relied on for prosecution are inseparable. Limited to that
function, the results reached under it04 are unobjectionable.
47. State v. Briggs, 122 Minn. 493, 142 N. W. 823 (1913).
48. State v. Anderson, 155 Minn. 132, 192 N. W. 934 (1923).
49. See State v. Ryan, 156 Minn. 186, 192, 194 N. W. 396, 399 (1923).
50. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 300 (3d ed. 1940).
51. See, e.g., State v. Sabatini, 171 Minn. 137, 213 N. IV. 552 (1927);
State v. Rosenberg, 155 Minn. 37, 192 N. W. 194 (1923) ; State v. Southall,
77 Minn. 296, 79 N. W. 1007 (1899).
52. See State v. Jansen, 207 Minn. 250, 290 N. W. 557 (1940) ; State
v. Bourne, 86 Minn. 426, 90 N. W. 1105 (1902).
53. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 218 (3d ed. 1940).
54. State v. Bowers, 178 Minn. 589, 228 N. W. 164 (1929).
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The court has been most liberal in admitting evidence of other
crimes in the sex crime cases," and has even admitted it to show
an inclination of the defendant to commit the crime charged 0 The
distinction between evidence showing an inclination, which can
be shown in these cases, and a disposition, which is supposedly
never admissible,5 7 is dubious at best. The court has, however,
limited this type of evidence to a showing of other similar acts with
the prosecutrix.58 The court's liberality in admitting evidence in this
type of crime is somewhat illogical. Since natural prejudice against
the sex offender is so great, it would seem that he should be offorded
more, rather than less, protection. The reason for this liberal ad-
missibility is not clear, but appears to rest on a belief that other acts
with the prosecutrix show lust of the defendant for this particular
girl rather than mere disposition to commit this type of crime. Thus,
this evidence is used to show intent or design. 9 Such reasoning
appears to be little more than rationalization to explain a complete
departure from the exclusion rule which will not fit this situation.
In several of the carnal knowledge cases the prosecuting attorney
has presented evidence of several acts of the defendant and the
prosecutrix, and then after all evidence was in, has elected the speci-
fic act on which to base the prosecution. In an early case the con-
viction was reversed when, after electing to rely on one act, the
prosecution offered evidence on another ;60 but later cases have
allowed an election after evidence of several acts had been pre-
sented.61 It has been said to be a matter for the discretion of the
trial judge.0 2 Allowing the prosecutor to proceed in this manner
probably makes the defense more difficult, but in view of the court's
liberal attitude in this type of case, it actually has little effect on
whether the evidence of other acts of the accused will be admitted.
This problem has only arisen in carnal knowledge cases, but there
would appear to be no objection to the same procedure in other
55, See State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 29, 138 N. W. 937, 938 (1912).
56. See State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915) ; State v.
Schueller mtpra note 53; see State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 621, 289 N. W.
575, 577 (1940).
57. See note 6 supra and text thereto. But see State v. Shtemme, 133
Minn. 184, 158 N. W. 48 (1916).
58. State v. Haney, 219 Minn. 518, 18 N. W. 2d 315 (1945) ; State v.
Friend, 151 Minn. 138, 186 N. W. 241 (1922); see 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence 548-551 (11th ed. 1935). But cf. State v. Shtemme, 133 Minn. 184,
158 N. W. 48 (1916).
59. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 357 (3d ed. 1940).
60. State v. Masteller, 45 Minn. 128,47 N. W. 541 (1890).
61. State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915); State v.
Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 138 N. W. 937 (1912).
62. See State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 28, 138 N. W. 937, 938 (1912).
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crimes, so long as the acts were so closely related as to require that
they all be shown.63
Where the court has deemed the evidence relevant and has
been unable to squeeze it in under one of the known exceptions, it
has invented new exceptions. Resorting to the so-called exceptions
of showing willingness and readiness"1 and of characterizing the
act charged, 8 points up the inadequacy of the exclusion theory
to cover all situations.
EXCLUSION AND ADMISSION THEORIES COMPARED
Professor Stone believes that a return to the admission theory
would eliminate many of the shortcomings that presently exist.6
With proper application of the admission theory, Professor Stone's
contention would piobably be substantiated. The distinction be-
tween the admission and the exclusion theory is not so much a
matter of words as it is a way of thinking. The admission theory
admits relevant evidence so long as it shows more than disposition
to commit the crime charged. However, to show that the evidence
does indicate more than disposition, it must be pertinent to the
proof of defendant's commission of the crime charged. As this is
the exact purpose and scope of the exceptions to the exclusion
theory, 7 the same result is reached in most cases by applying
either theory. The two rules reach different results in the situations
where the evidence in question is relevant but not clearly under any
of the exceptions to the exclusion theory. A court strictly applying
the exclusion theory would rule such evidence out. The same evi-
dence would be admitted by a court applying the admission theory
if it was relevant for any reason other than to show disposition. Be-
cause of the similarity of the two theories, it is not difficult to under-
stand why the courts have been confused in their treatment of this
type of evidence and why our court has not been consistent,68 at
63. See State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 189-190, 150 N. W. 793, 794
(1915). Referring to the problem of election the court said: "A different
rule may obtain in cases of crimes so wholly unrelated that proof of other
offenses is not properly in the case at all. We are not concerned with such
cases here, and we make no decision in regard thereto."
64. See note 34 supra.
65. See note 35 supra.
66. See Stone, supra note 4, at 1033-1037.
67. See note 2 rupra and text thereto.
68. See State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 122, 192 N. W. 737, 739 (1923)
(dissenting opinion).
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times apparently applying the admission theory,69 and at times the
exclusion theory.7"
Proper application of the admission theory requires evidence to
fill but one qualification-that it be relative to the proof of the
crime charged.71 This rule is certainly not a panacea, for deter-
mination of what evidence is relevant will still be difficult in some
cases. It would, however, tend to eliminate the problems involved
in attempting to differentiate between the exceptions, trying to fit
evidence under one of them, or in the invention of new exceptions
to take care of relevant evidence that will not fit under any exist-
ing exception.
IMPEAC HIENT OF THE DEFENDANT
The rule preventing a showing of defendant's other crimes is
seriously altered when the defendant becomes a witness. There-
fore, the problem of the impeachment of the defendant
as a witness must necessarily be covered even though no considera-
tion is given to the problem of impeachment of witnesses generally.
When he takes the stand, the defendant waives a large portion of
his immunity from the showing of his other crimes. A Minnesota
statute 2 makes such evidence competent upon defendant's credi-
bility as a witness.7 3 The extent to which the prosecution may go
into such facts is limited, however, and it is not proper to go into
the details of the crimes to any great extent,74 the question being
69. E.g., State v. McGraw, 163 Minn. 154, 203 N. V. 771 (1925)
("proper to be considered" upon defendant's possession of the stolen goods) ;
State v. Hartung, 141 Minn. 207, 169 N. WV. 712 (1918) (admitted as being
"germane to the issue") ; State v. Kaufman, 125 Minn. 315, 146 N. XV. 1115
(1914) (admitted as "relevant to the issue") ; State v. Hayward, 62 Minn.
474, 65 N. W. 63 (1895) (admitted as "relevant to the issue").
70. E.g., St. Paul v. Greene, 56 N. V. 2d 423 (Minn. 1952) ; State v.
Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. V. 225 (1930) ; State v. Fitchette. 88 Minn.
145, 92 N. W. 527 (1902). The Fitchette case is one of the strongest Minne-
sota cases strictly applying the exclusion theory. The court has frequently
been required to distinguish this case to admit evidence of other crimes. See,
e.g., State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 456, 231 N. W. 225, 228 (1930)
State v. Ames, 90 Minn. 183, 191-193, 96 N. W. 330, 333 (1903).
71. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 311 (1942), adopts the admission
theory: "Subject to Rule 306, evidence that a person committed a crime or
civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending to prove that
he committed a crime or civil wrong on another occasion if, but only if,
the evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition to commit
such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil wrongs generally."
72. Minn. Stat. § 610.49 (1949).
73. E.g., State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 112 N. IV. 409 (1907) ; State
v. Curtis, 39 Minn. 357, 40 N. W. 263 (1888). Of course, the prosecution may
not introduce evidence merely to show defendant's bad character if he has
not put his character in issue. State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 181 N. V.
850 (1921) (alternative holding).
74. State v. Abdo, 165 Minn. 440, 206 N. W. 933 (1926).
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one for the discretion of the trial judge.7 Even though objections
to the questions of the overzealous prosecutor are sustained, the
prejudice resulting in the minds of the jury from merely asking the
questions may result in reversal.7 6 However, if the abuse is not so
flagrant that it cannot be overcome by proper instruction, a verdict
for the state will in all probability be sustained .
7
The court's eagerness to admit this type of evidence, manifested
by their squeezing in evidence under exceptions and by its inventing
of new exceptions, has also shown itself in its seeming desire to
admit evidence on the basis of defendant's trial tactics. It apparently
takes little testimony on the defendant's behalf to pave the way
for the prosecution to introduce evidence which may show other
crimes to contradict the defendant's assertions. In State v. Mc-
Clendon,7 8 the state was allowed to introduce evidence which showed
the defendant's perpetration of prior crimes in order to contradict
his testimony even though it concerned a collateral matter. Where
the defendant has introduced any evidence concerning alleged
crimes by him, the state is free, within the discretion of the trial
judge, to go into the details of these crimes.79
If the reasons for holding evidence of other crimes inadmissible
are deemed valid, it seems that allowing the evidence to be injected
into the case just because the defendant takes the stand is contrary
to our accusatorial system.80 A more serious result is that it tends
to discourage the defendant from taking the stand. While the
argument that the defendant as a witness should be subject to the
same impeachment as other witnesses is difficult to dispute, it
should be remembered that other witnesses are not on trial. The
Model Code would make evidence of the commission or conviction
of the defendant of other crimes inadmissible to impair his credibility
unless he first introduced evidence of good character.8, The rule
recognize the fact that all this type of evidence, whether admitted as
substantive evidence, to impeach credibility, or to show bad char-
acter, has the same prejudicial effect.
75. See State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 455, 39 N. W. 2d 887, 890 (1949);
State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 338-339, 112 N. W. 409, 411 (1907).
76. State v. Sanderson, 179 Minn. 436, 229 N. W. 564 (1930) ; State v.
Glazer, 176 Minn. 442, 223 N. W. 769 (1929) ; cf. State v. Silvers, 230 Minn.
12, 40 N. W. 2d 630 (1950).
77. State v. Towers, 106 Minn. 105, 118 N. W. 361 (1908).
78. 172 M inn. 106, 214 N. W. 782 (1927).
79. See State v. Thornton, 174 Minn. 323, 330, 219 N. W. 176, 179
(1928) ; State v. Upson, 162 'Mii. 9, 13-14, 201 N. W. 913, 914 (1925).
80. See note 16 supra and text thereto.
81. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106 (1942). The applicable sections




The exclusion theory is not necessarily bad because of the re-
sults to which it leads. In fact, as indicated earlier,s2 application of
either theory brings about the same result in most cases. The
primary fault of the exclusion theory is the uncertainty it engenders.
In a situation where the evidence in question does not clearly come
under any of the exceptions it cannot be accurately determined
whether the evidence will be admitted. If the court applies the
rule strictly, some relevant evidence will not be admitted.8 3 If, on
the other hand, the court concentrates on whether the evidence
comes within an exception, it may overlook the question of relevance
and admit irrelevant evidence. 4
Even if the exclusion theory is followed this does not mean that
the presently existing confusion cannot be largely eliminated. As
the decision to a large measure rests within the discretion of the
trial judge,85 he should weigh the interests involved in making his
decision. Merely going through the mechanical process of deter-
mining whether the evidence comes within one of the recognized
exceptions will not adequately resolve the desires to admit all
relevant evidence but to exclude evidence fraught with so many
dangers to the accused except where absolutely necessary8 6 for
"(1) Subject to Paragraphs (2) and (3), for the purpose of impairing
or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party
calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning
any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his
credibility as a witness, and need not, in examining him as to a statement
made by him in writing inconsistent with any part of his testimony, show
or read to him any part of the writing, except that extrinsic evidence shall
be inadmissible.
"... (b) of his conviction of crime not involving dishonesty or false
statements, or
". .. (3) For the purpose of impairing the credibility of an accused
in a criminal action who testifies at a trial therein the accused shall not at
that trial be examined, nor shall any evidence be admitted, as to facts tending
to prove his commission or conviction of another crime, unless he has first
introduced evidence of his character to support his credibility."
The comment to the rule admits that most decisions are to the contrary.
Id. at 54.
82. See note 66 supra and text thereto.
83. E.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 292-293, 61 N. E. 286, 294
(1901). Evidence of another poisoning by defendant committed in almost
identical manner to that charged was held inadmissible as the court did not
find that it came under any of the exceptions. The dissent would have admitted
it as relevant evidence.
84. State v. Voss, 192 Minn. 127, 255 N. W. 843 (1934). Evidence of
the theft of some barley was admitted to show intent in the theft of the pigs
for which defendant was being prosecuted.
85. See State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 455, 39 N. W. 2d 887, 890 (1949);
State v. Voss, 192 Minn. 127, 129, 255 N. W. 843, 844 (1934).
86. In certain types of prosecutions this kind of evidence is virtually
essential for conviction, while in others there is little actual necessity for it.
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conviction. If the relevance and necessity factors do outweigh the
dangers, there should be little difficulty in fitting the evidence
within one of the numerous exceptions.
While leaving the determinations of relevance, necessity and
danger with the trial judge may lose any advantage that there might
be in rigid rules, the greater advantage of reaching more equitable
results through individual consideration of each case will be
obtained.
87
Embezzlement cases, where one incorrect entry in the books could be a
mistake is a good example of a case in which evidence of other "mistakes"
is needed to rebut the inference of mistake.
87. The Legislature, by passing the Model Code, could eliminate many
of the problems involved in evidence of other crimes. They have eliminated
some of the problems with regard to embezzlement by passage of Minn.
Stat. § 628.27 (1949) which allows the prosecutor to merely allege a larceny
of a certain sum. He is then allowed to present evidence of the accused's
larcenous activities within a six month period. He need not elect any one
act or time. This has resulted in largely eliminating the necessity to resort
to the scheme or plan exception to admit evidence of other crimes in these
cases.
